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INTRODUCTION 
by Robert A. Kapp 
The four articles published here were originally presented as public lectures 
at Rice University in October, 1972. The purpose of "Four Views of China," 
as this series of addresses was called, was to bring to the University and to 
the Houston community a number of eminent and eloquent China scholars, 
and to offer to a general audience a set of stimulating and informative talks 
on significant aspects of Chinese civilization. For a variety of reasons, most 
of them relating to the type of address sought by the series's organizers and 
to the organizers' determination to avoid the temptations of one more "China 
in the 1970s" format, no single theme was adopted for the series as a whole. 
Instead, the four invited guests were asked to present, to a general audience, 
the ideas and problems to which their own scholarly work had taken them. 
As a lecture series, "Four Views of China" was highly successful: audiences 
were uniformly large and enthusiastic, and, as the articles that follow show, 
the quality of the addresses was very high. The series served as a fine example 
of what articulate and able scholars, even in relatively esoteric fields, can 
contribute to the public understanding of complex and alien problems. 
As Professor Frederick Mote has told us, the goal of examining specific 
aspects of China's civilization and the Chinese past is to sharpen our "under- 
standing of Chinam-a grandiose goal to be sure, but nonetheless a worthy 
one. In discussing China with a non-specialist audience, the pursuit of this 
goal is not easy. The specialist must convey to his hearers valid meaningful 
arguments while avoiding the dual pitfalls of becoming too concerned with 
minute data on the one hand and of doing excessive violence to the inevitable 
complexities of his subject on the other. He must provide the necessary 
concreteness for his audience to grasp his point, at the risk of paying little 
attention to broader and more profound problems which his points may 
illustrate but which he cannot take the time to develop. 
This Introduction will not attempt to develop and elaborate an imaginary 
central theme running through the essays it prefaces. It will, however, try 
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to point out a few of the larger implications of the essays, and to discuss some 
of the relationships (complementary and contradictory) between two or more 
of them. In discussing these thematic and interpretive problems it is well to 
bear in mind the unresolved questions of how and to what degree scholarly 
discussions can serve to improve the non-specialist's "understanding of 
China." 
We may start with Professor Arthur Wright's and Professor Jonathan 
Spence's remarks, since both are devoted to aspects of Chinese political be- 
havior, historical and more recent. Professor Wright's remarks, like those of 
Professor Spence, explicitly raise the broad issue of form and content, of 
continuity and change, which so much of the quest for understanding has 
suggested. By pursuing his theme with temporally disparate examples, 
Professor Wright underscores the vaIue of perceiving historical continuities 
in the present. Though he does not dwell upon it, he suggests the outlines 
of a characteristic relationship between culture and government in China, 
the attitudinal bases of which seem today remarkably similar to those of a 
Confucian statesman a century or even a millennium ago. The assumption 
of the moral perfectibility of man, the axiom that government is inseparable 
from the moral condition of the governors and the governed, runs through 
Confucian literature as it does through the Thought of Mao Tse-tung. Work- 
ing from the specific case of propaganda and persuasion in imperial and 
communist China, Professor Wright uses the past-even the remote past, by 
western standards-to make the Chinese present more comprehensible. The 
ignorant but all too widespread assumption that "Chinese culture," however 
that is defined, was destroyed with the arrival of communist power, crumbles 
in the face of Professor Wright's arguments for continuity in the use of moral 
suasion as a means of political control. 
Yet the insight that historical awareness provides here can be developed 
further; Professor Wright's provocative interpretation gives rise to further 
questions. Reference to the "traditional susceptibility" of the Chinese "as a 
people" to certain forms of psychological manipulation and psycho-political 
persuasion opens the door to the subject of national character, or of a 
uniquely Chinese "political culture," analysis of which promises to yield 
highly sophisticated interpretations of Chinese political behavior. The two 
most important investigations of this tempting concept as it relates to China 
have been misleading but fortunately not persuasive,' and the full usefulness 
of responsible generalization about Chinese political culture, if it can indeed 
be identified, awaits later realization. 
To put the problem another way, once historical continuities are perceived, 
the meaning of those continuities remains to be explored. The use of moral 
suasion for political control may have very long roots in China, but it can 
hardly be said that political ideology in the People's Republic of China merely 
continues the political thinking of the imperial era as a whole (or even of 
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the late imperial period alone). The profound conservatism of Confucian 
social and political ideology, to which both Professors Wright and Mote 
allude, contrasts sharply with the despairing iconoclasm of early twentieth- 
century intellectuals, and starkly with such staple Maoist injunctions as "Dare 
to Rebel," which echoed round the world during the Great Proletarian Cul- 
tural Revolution. 
Professor Spence's address, which also points out the persistent significance 
of certain social and political probIems over several centuries of Chinese 
history, speaks to the problem of continuity and change, of familiar form 
and unfamiliar content, that Professor Wright has raised. The long history 
of the spread of Chinese cultural forms from early centers in Northern 
China to the edges of Tibet and Siberia and the South China coast, and the 
geographical characteristics of China's border lands, have left a legacy of 
tension along Chinese frontiers that most rulers of China in turn have had 
to confront. This has been particularly true in Inner Asia: the K'ang-hsi 
Emperor was not the first Chinese monarch to face opposition in Tibet, nor 
the first emperor to feel the pressure of non-Chinese expansion in the north- 
eastern area that was lately called Manchuria. For example, the ancestors 
of the Manchu peoples themselves swept into China in the twelfth century 
and forced the reigning Sung court to flee south to the Yangtze Valley and 
below (thus hastening the process of southward Chinese migration that 
eventually put the island of Taiwan within reach of Chinese settlement). 
Similarly, the dilemma of an enormously powerful, energetic, even original 
leader who stands at the apex of a highly ritualized, bureaucratized, and 
frequently corrupt political apparatus has persisted throughout much of 
China's imperial and postimperial history. Without going into the interesting 
personal detail which Professor Spence brings to his discussion of the K'ang- 
hsi Emperor in the seventeenth century and Mao Tse-tung in the twentieth, 
Joseph Levenson years ago expanded on the endless tension between the 
monarch and his dependent-yet-potentially-fractious bureaucratic officials.' 
It is worth remembering, in contemplating Mao Tse-tung's style of leadership 
and his seemingly antibureaucratic inclinations, that China has enjoyed (or 
suffered) a highly sophisticated and unique form of bureaucratic administra- 
tion for two thousand years, far longer than any comparable system has 
existed in the west. Despite major alterations in the relationship of principal 
leader to officialdom from imperial times to the People's Republic of China, 
Mao's frustrations with "bureaucratism," 'kommandism," and "mountain 
strongholdism" all represent, at least to some degree, a modern-day working 
out of the traditional tension between Chinese rulers and their government's 
administrative personnel. 
Once again, however, the fact of perceptible continuity, while revealing, 
must not stand alone. The meaning of historical inheritance depends on 
interpretation, and interpretation usually leads in the direction of complexity 
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and paradox. Consider the Chinese chauvinism of the K'ang-hsi emperor, 
for example; the grand confidence in what Professor Spence calls "China's 
greatness," that K'ang-hsi, as a vigorous and great Chinese emperor, natu- 
rally displayed (even though he was himself not Chinese and was highly 
conscious of his un-Chineseness). Then consider the proud revolutionary 
nationalism of Mao Tse-tung, who has led his country out of the shadow of 
international humiliation while rejecting the traditional political and social 
order that had once sustained the K'ang-hsi emperor's position and view of 
the world. Here are two powerful leaders, both proud of their China and 
determined to increase its strength. Was the K'ang-hsi emperor a "nation- 
alist," then? Hardly, since the very idea of nationhood was unknown to him 
and would have been intensely repugnant to him if he had known of it. 
Perhaps, as is often said, Mao is just another "imperial" ruler demonstrating 
the sanie assumptions of China's cultural centrality that rulers of the Middle 
Kingdom demonstrated centuries before. But this interpretation too is invalid 
for many reasons, one of which is the prominence of implicitly anti- 
imperial nationalist ideas in Mao's own intellectual development and politi- 
cal ideology. 
Thus the notion of continuity, which adds much to our vision of modern 
Chinese institutions and culture, must be accompanied first by recognition 
of the changes in content which are found within the continuities of form 
in modern China, and second by a recognition that visible continuities in 
a single strand of Chinese cultural or political behavior may not prove the 
corresponding existence of much broader continuities. If a foreigner who 
visited China around the year 1700 could somehow return there today, he 
would recognize instantly that he was once again in China, but he would 
soon realize as we11 that the China to which he returned had been transformed 
since his last visit by its revolutionary history. 
Like Professor Wright's and Professor Spence's remarks, Professor Mote's 
discussion of urbanization and urban life in China over a millennium clearly 
underscores the importance of perceiving historical continuities in "under- 
standing China." But Professor Mote introduces another major theme as well, 
that of the equivalence or comparability of related phenomena in Chinese 
and Western experience. As the example of Chinese urbanization shows, the 
dimensions of broad fields of human experience sometimes far exceed those 
of the observer's own culture. As a scholar with especially deep ties to China 
as well as a keen vision of his own society, Professor Mote inquires with 
particular insight into China's historical experience in the management of 
social affairs, organization of government, or the conduct of urban life. One 
should not have to be a sinologue, much less a sinophile, to see the value 
of this. For one thing, learning about the forms which shared human experi- 
ence takes in a sophisticated alien culture can break the artificial boundaries 
of one's own awareness. This is clearly the case with the recent western 
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"discovery" of Chinese traditional medicine, most notably the techniques of 
acupuncture; the common human problem of health care and medicine takes 
on a new dimension with the realization that a whole sphere of effective 
medical practice has lain beyond the range of vision of the western medical 
profession. For another thing, in cases where examination of a broad common 
concern produces only very remotely applicable insights, or insights that seem 
to have no applicability at all to the observer's problems, the observer can 
still learn more about himself by perceiving what he is not, and what his 
milieu is not. 
In the process, many an observer, confident in his cosmopolitanism, will 
awake to the narrowness and the limitations of his awareness. Just as the 
Chinese, assured for centuries of their supreme cosmopolitanism in a world 
entirely ruled by the Chinese emperor, awoke to discover their own provin- 
cialism in a nineteenth-century international world that they had had no part 
in making, so many people in the western world, and particularly the United 
States, have to discover the provincialism of their own world view, even in 
the industrial and technological world that the west until recently has largely 
made for itself. This is particularly true in the realm of "modernization," a 
vaguely defined but alluring term which increasingly applies to China as well 
as to the West. The prospect of a truly Chinese modernization, not merely 
a superficial transplantation of certain western modes to the surface of Chi- 
neselife, should shake our assurance that the road to modernity was discovered 
in Europe or made in the United States, and that the path to modernization 
is somehow immutable. The problem of modernization's relationship to wes- 
ternization is one of the most significant offshoots of the question of equiva- 
lence and comparability that Professor Mote's essay raises. 
In his remarks on the city in China in general and on Soochow in particular, 
Professor Mote offers many profound and fascinating insights, not only into 
the form and history of Chinese cities, but into Chinese assumptions about 
the dimensions and properties of historic time and the embodiment of mean- 
ing in chosen forms of cultural artifacts, especially the written word. Professor 
Wright, too, spoke of the peculiar significance of the written word in tradi- 
tional China, and as I shall note below, Professor Loehr speaks indirectly 
to that point as well. Another point that Professor Mote argues persuasively, 
here and in another essay, is that in China city and countryside have long 
enjoyed a complementary relationship which is unfamiliar to the West. The 
existence of a rural-urban continuum, reinforced by the prevalence of a rural, 
almost pastoral ideal, contrasts sharply with the dichotomous, even hostile, 
relationship between urban and rural areas in the West. Recognition of this 
vastly different relationship perhaps impels us to reevaluate our own notions 
of the meaning of urbanization, and to recognize, as Professor Mote explicitly 
points out, that the western experience of urbanization is not really repre- 
sentative of the world's experience of the growth and life of cities. 
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At the same time, pointing out this unfamiliar pattern of rural-urban rela- 
tionships in China poses once again real questions of emphasis between 
historical accuracy and meaningful generalization. For while the broad out- 
line sketched by Professor Mote is both meaningful and valid, it is nonetheless 
true that with the passage of time the nature of Chinese cities and the rela- 
tionship between urban and rural areas in China changed significantly. The 
dramatic similarity in plan and layout between twelfth-century and twen- 
tieth-century Soochow speaks to the essential continuities in Chinese urban 
experience. Yet it must still be admitted that particularIy in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, Chinese cities became increasingly isolated, cul- 
turally and economically, from their agrarian hinterlands. Treaty ports, where 
foreigners were permitted to live and do business under the protection of 
foreign-imposed treaties, became centers of modern industrial and financial 
organization, while their nearby and distant hinterlands remained nearly 
unaffected. Smaller cities, even the walled county capitals in many regions, 
seem to have become havens for formerly rural-dwelling Chinese landowners, 
who clustered in the cities and towns to escape the growing disorder of the 
countryside and lived on the fruits of their absentee landlordism. In the 
process of moving to the cities, these landowning gentry families lost contact 
with rural society and with the social and economic problems of rural life. 
Nineteenth- and twentieth-century China saw the growing alienation of the 
city from the countryside, the disruption of the urban-rural continuum of 
which Professor Mote speaks, and (in the view of some scholars) the draining 
of the resources of rural China to support the westernized, alien, often profli- 
gate lifestyles of a parasitic urban population. 
With this break in historical continuity in mind, how are we to assess the 
pronounced antiurban strain in Chinese communism and particularly in the 
thought and policies of Mao Tse-tung himself? Mao has shown a strong 
determination to prevent the further growth of mutually exclusive rural and 
urban societies in China. He refuses to tolerate the isolation of urban dwellers, 
particularly officeholders, administrators, and students, from the realities of 
peasant life. He looks with horror, as Professor Spence has pointed out, on 
the development of educated elites and entrenched bureaucracies that have 
lost touch with the economic and social struggles of the vast majority of 
China's population, the peasantry. Moreover, under Mao's leadership China 
is making vast efforts to spread the development of China's new high cul- 
ture-the culture of proletarianism and industrialism-throughout rural soci- 
ety, instead of permitting it to dwell and flourish in isolated urban islands 
of modernization. There are innumerable signs of these efforts, the most 
conspicuous of which have been the decentralization of industrial production 
and the distribution of small, labor-intensive industrial facilities among the 
rural communes all over China. 
This determination to break down the barriers between urban and rural 
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sectors that had arisen in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is intriguing, 
to say the least. Should we detect in it a touch of the old ruralism, despite 
Mao's vigorous rejection ofthe Confucian ideology that undergirded ruralism 
in the past, and despite the Chinese communists' wholehearted adoption of 
the goal of industrialization, itself a product and a cause of modern urbaniza- 
tion in western societies? 
The remarks of Professors Wright and Spence have spoken to the impor- 
tance of recognizing continuities between the distant and recent past and even 
the present in China, while Professor Mote, in addition to pointing this out 
again, has also raised the question of comparability and equivalence as a 
factor in any attempt to "understand China." My comments on Professor 
Max Loehr's stimulating paper will be limited to a single issue, not because 
the work does not merit longer comments but because full comprehension 
of his field requires greater specialization than is mine. The issue on which 
I will comment is one where Professor Loehr's interpretation seemingly 
diverges from those of Professors Mote and Wright. 
In their comments, both Professor Mote and Professor Wright had occasion 
to point out the unique significance that the written word held in traditional 
China. In a society where literacy was highly limited and where literacy was 
the passkey to the refined moral and social wisdom of China's high culture, 
the written word came to have an almost mystic significance; it became the 
repository of truth and value. Yet Professor Loehr suggests that there was 
in China another explicitly nonverbal embodiment of truth and value, 
namely painting, especially landscape painting. 
Two possible explanations of this apparent divergence raise once again 
the issue of the uses and pitfalls of generalization in the pursuit of under- 
standing about China. One explanation would be that in the imperial China 
of which all three scholars speak, there were more kinds of truth than simply 
the moral and categorical truths enunciated in Confucian classics and 
repeated or elaborated in endless examples of Confucian literature over two 
millennia. That is to say, perhaps there were un-Confucian truths-perhaps 
Taoist truths-more susceptible to embodiment and expression in painting 
than to exposition in literature. Or perhaps Chinese landscape painting, 
which was, after all, among the most highly prized activities of the Confucian 
elite itself, proves that even Confucian "truth" and "value" had more dimen- 
sions than could be encompassed by literature and the written word alone. 
Both of these points are elementary, and both are valid. Social and meta- 
physical values in China were not unidimensional; the assumption that they 
were has helped to undermine one of the unsuccessful attempts to define 
China's "political culture" that I mentioned before. Not only did Confucian- 
ism fail to stand alone as the fountain ofvalue and truth in traditional Chinese 
society over two thousand years, but the content and implications of Con- 
fucianism itself changed with time, for example taking on new metaphysical 
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overtones in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Professor Loehr's discussion 
of the content of Chinese landscape painting complements and serves to fill 
out the images of Chinese society and politics which Professors Wright, Mote, 
and Spence help to construct. 
Having discussed some ramifications of the essays published herein, we 
can return to the question: is it reasonable to speak of "understanding China" 
to a general audience? The answer is cautious but affirmative. If by "under- 
standing" we mean humane toleration and the reduction of doctrinaire in- 
flexibility, then with care progress can be made. Progress depends on the use 
of intelligent generalization, on the illumination of historical continuity, for 
example, and on paying attention to the comparability between Chinese 
experience and the observer's own. It also depends on the humble (and 
cheerful) recognition that generalizations usually can be qualified; that the 
search for reality deepens with the investigator's expertise; that differing 
interpretations inevitably attend the examination of complex phenomena. 
Within this framework, we hope that "Four Views of China" stands as a good 
example of what can be done. 
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